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LABORATORYMEASUREOF CHEATING PREDICTS SCHOOL
MISCONDUCT*
Alain Cohn and Michel André Maréchal
Laboratory experiments provide insights into the drivers of cheating behaviour, but it is unclear
to what extent cheating in the lab generalizes to the ﬁeld. We conducted an experiment with
middle and high school students to test whether a common laboratory measure of cheating pre-
dicts three types of school misconduct: (i) disruptiveness in class, (ii) homework non-completion,
and (iii) absenteeism. We ﬁnd that students who cheat in the experimental task are more likely
to misbehave at school, suggesting that experimental measures of cheating generalize to rule
violating behaviour in naturally occurring environments.
Cheating, misconduct and other forms of rule violating behaviour are pervasive problems
in many important areas of social and economic life. Examples range from scandals in
the business world (e.g., Volkswagen's recent emission fraud or interest and exchange
rate manipulations in the ﬁnancial industry) to rigged sport competitions (Duggan et al.
2002), rampant corruption in developing countries (Pande and Olken 2012; Banerjee
et al. 2013), and student and teacher cheating (Jacob and Levitt 2003; Levitt and Lin
2015).
Given the prevalence and cost of dishonesty to society, a rapidly growing literature
has emerged with the aim to provide a better understanding of the determinants of
lying, cheating, and stealing (see Ariely 2012; Irlenbusch and Villeval 2015, and Shalvi
et al. 2015 for recent reviews). Due to its clandestine nature, dishonest behaviour is
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typically diﬃcult to measure reliably using observational ﬁeld data (Zitzewitz 2012). As
a consequence, the majority of empirical ﬁndings originates from controlled laboratory
environments.1
A widely used experimental paradigm to measure cheating is to instruct subjects to
perform a simple task of chance (e.g., ﬂipping coins or rolling dice) and asking them to
report their outcomes. Because the actual outcomes are not observed by the experimenter
and only certain outcomes are rewarded, subjects face the temptation to increase their
earnings by misreporting their outcomes without any risk of getting caught (e.g., Bucciol
and Piovesan 2011; Shalvi et al. 2011; Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013; Cohn et al.
2014; Abeler et al. 2016).2 Although cheating cannot be detected at the individual
level, researchers can measure cheating at the group level as the true distribution of the
underlying random process is known. Moreover, because higher earnings are less likely
to be the result of chance, earnings claimed by individual subjects can serve as a proxy
for their cheating behaviour. While this paradigm has been used extensively to study the
determinants of dishonesty and rule violating behaviour, the extent to which the insights
gained from the lab can be extrapolated to naturally occurring environments remains
unclear. Common objections to the generalizability of lab experiments are that subjects
make low-stakes decisions in artiﬁcial environments and that they know their behaviour
is being recorded and analysed (Levitt and List 2007; Falk and Heckman 2009).
In this paper we investigate whether cheating in the lab predicts rule violating be-
haviour in the ﬁeld. To this end, we matched a common laboratory measure of cheat-
ing with teacher evaluations of students' misbehaviour in school. We experimentally
measured cheating by asking the students to toss ten coins in private and report their
outcomes. Students only received ﬁnancial rewards when reporting heads, and thus
had a ﬁnancial incentive to misreport their outcomes for unsuccessful coin ﬂips. Our
1See Pierce and Balasubramanian (2015) for a survey of the literature on dishonest behaviour that
uses observational data and ﬁeld experiments.
2Another common approach are interactive sender-receiver games where senders can increase their
earnings by sending deceptive messages to the receiver (e.g., Gneezy 2005; Sutter 2009).
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measures of school misbehaviour are based on the US National Education Longitudinal
Survey. Speciﬁcally, we asked teachers to assess their students along three dimensions:
disruptiveness in class, non-completion of homework, and absenteeism. These measures
of school misconduct are important as they have been shown to reliably predict future
educational achievement and labour market outcomes (Segal 2013; Autor et al. 2015).3
We expect the laboratory measure of cheating to be predictive of school misconduct
because both cheating and school misconduct require people to break rules.
We found a positive and signiﬁcant correlation between the laboratory measure of
cheating and students' misbehaviour in school. This relationship remains strong after
adding controls for age, gender, nationality, school level, parental education and cogni-
tive ability. Our estimates indicate that the diﬀerence in school misbehaviour between
students who claimed ten coins (presumably cheaters) and those who claimed ﬁve coins
(presumably honest individuals) is, on average, 0.53 standard deviations. For compari-
son, we observe the same gap in school misbehaviour between students whose cognitive
abilities (i.e., crystallized intelligence) diﬀer by 2.7 standard deviations. Together, these
results suggest that the cheating paradigm from the lab provides an externally valid
measure of rule violating behaviour in the ﬁeld.
Our paper contributes to several strands of the literature. First, a growing number
of studies combines lab and ﬁeld data from the same subjects to examine the external
validity of laboratory measures of behaviour.4 For example, Karlan (2005) found that
second-mover behaviour in a trust game correlates with the likelihood of loan repayment
among participants of a microcredit program in Peru.5 Using experimental measures of
present bias, Sutter et al. (2013) show that more impatient children and adolescents are
3Disruptive and noncompliant behaviour in school also seem to matter for students' current academic
performance as we found negative and signiﬁcant correlations between students' self-reported grade point
average (GPA) and the three measures of school misbehaviour (disruptiveness: p = 0.001, homework:
p < 0.001, absenteeism: p = 0.002, Spearman tests).
4See Camerer (2015) for an overview of experimental studies linking behaviour in the lab and ﬁeld.
5Benz and Meier (2008), Carpenter and Myers (2010), Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011), Burks et al.
(2015), and Cohn et al. (2015a) provide further evidence for positive associations between lab and ﬁeld
measures of prosociality.
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more likely to buy alcohol and cigarettes, are more likely to be obese, and are less likely to
save money.6 Our ﬁndings suggest that cheating in the lab provides a reliable indicator of
rule violating behaviour in the ﬁeld. Only a few studies analysed the relationship between
rule violation in the lab and the ﬁeld. Hanna and Wang (forthcoming) examined cheating
in a sample of government nurses in India. They found that nurses who cheated more
in a dice task also tended to show up at work less often. Cohn et al. (2015b) conducted
a coin tossing experiment with inmates from a maximum-security prison. They found
a positive correlation between claimed earnings from the coin tosses and misconduct
in prison (e.g., illegal drug possession or aggression against guards and other inmates).
However, the latter studies used rather unusual participants drawn from the extreme
ends of the honesty distribution. Recently, Dai et al. (forthcoming) reported a die-
rolling experiment with public transport passengers showing that the proportion of fully
dishonest participants is higher among those who did not hold a valid ticket. It is
reassuring that these papers provide evidence that is consistent with our study despite
using diﬀerent methods and subject pools.7
Second, our paper also speaks to a growing literature on school misconduct as man-
ifestations of non-cognitive skills.8 For example, Segal (2013) shows that students mis-
behaving in eighth grade are almost three times less likely to ﬁnish high school and have
almost 10% lower earnings as adults relative to non-disruptive students. Bertrand and
Pan (2013) found that behavioural problems in school are more prevalent among boys,
especially if they grow up in single-mother households. This ﬁnding may explain the
widening gender gap in academic achievement in the United States and other developed
6Meier and Sprenger (2010) show that experimentally elicited present bias is a reliable predictor of
credit card borrowing.
7List (2009) analysed a subsample of 17 sellers from open air markets for which he observed lab
and ﬁeld behaviour. He found that sellers who breached collusive agreements in contextualized lab
experiments were also more likely to do so in the ﬁeld. More recently, Potters and Stoop (2016) and
Kröll and Rustagi (2017) ﬁnd that subjects who cheat in the lab are also less likely to report accidental
overpayments and are more likely to adulterate milk with water, respectively.
8Externalizing behaviour and misconduct in school are typically seen as expressions of non-cognitive
skills and relate to personality traits such as agreeableness and conscientiousness (see Ehrler et al. 1999;
Almlund et al. 2011).
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countries (Goldin et al. 2006; Becker et al. 2010; Fortin et al. 2015). We ﬁnd that male
students cheat signiﬁcantly more and that this gender diﬀerence in the coin tossing task
explains about one-ﬁfth of the gender gap in school misbehaviour. Our paper also links
to an emerging literature on the relationship between economic preferences and non-
cognitive skills (Becker et al. 2012; Almlund et al. 2011). The identiﬁed relationship
between cheating behaviour and school misconduct raises the possibility that intrinsic
honesty and expressions of non-cognitive skills at school share a common underlying
mechanism.
1. Design
We conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment with 162 students from eight classes in two
Swiss public schoolsone middle and one high school. Students were between 12 and
20 years old, and 43% of them were female. They were informed that their data will be
treated conﬁdentially and that we will not reveal their data to others, including their
teachers and school authorities. The experiment took place in the classrooms in absence
of the teachers. We set up a mobile laboratory and installed partition walls to shield
subjects from sight and therefore ensure privacy (see Figure A.1 in the online appendix).9
Although participation was voluntary, all students gave their consent to participate in
the study. We ran the experiment simultaneously in all four classes at each school to
avoid cross-talk between subjects.
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, we asked subjects some basic socio-demographic
questions such as age, gender, nationality, and parental education (see Table 1 for de-
scriptive statistics). In part two, we measured their cognitive ability using two short
tests from Dohmen et al. (2010): the word ﬂuency test and the symbol-digit correspon-
9We took these measures to mitigate potential conﬁdentiality concerns. Such concerns could, in
principle, lead to an overestimation of the relationship between our laboratory measure of cheating and
misbehavior at school if the most well-behaved students in the class were more worried about data
privacy. We thank an anonymous referee for pointing this out.
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dence test.10 Both tests are related to working memory and processing speed, which
is often part of the reason children thrive or struggle in school, but they measure dis-
tinct concepts of reasoning capability (Carroll 1993).11 The word ﬂuency test measures
crystallized intelligence (ability to solve problems using knowledge and experience) by
asking subjects to list as many diﬀerent animals as possible within 90 seconds. Sub-
jects received one point for each correct and unique animal named. The symbol-digit
correspondence test measures ﬂuid intelligence (innate ability to solve problems) and
consists of decoding sets of unfamiliar symbols into single digits as fast as possible within
90 seconds. For each set, subjects had to write down the correct numbers under a grid of
nine symbols using a predeﬁned mapping between symbols and digits. Subjects scored
one point for each correct symbol-digit pair.
The last part of the experiment comprised the coin tossing taskour laboratory
measure of cheating. Subjects ﬁrst opened an envelope containing ten coins, each worth
0.5 Swiss francs (about US $0.55). Then, they were instructed to toss each coin in private
and report their outcomes on paper. For every coin toss for which subjects reported the
outcome heads they were allowed to keep the coin; they had to put the coin back
into the envelope otherwise. Participants thus faced a ﬁnancial incentive to cheat by
misreporting the outcomes of their coin ﬂips without any risk of getting caught.12 The
stakes were considerable as the maximum possible payoﬀ in this task corresponds roughly
to half the amount students of similar age receive in pocket money every week (e.g., see
www.budgetberatung.ch). After completing the coin tossing task, subjects were asked
to put their envelope with the remaining coins into a container.
Teachers were asked to assess their students along three dimensions: disruptiveness
in class, non-completion of homework, and absenteeism. For each item the teachers eval-
10The two cognitive ability tests are based on submodules of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS)one of the most frequently used intelligence tests.
11Test scores are positively correlated in our sample (Spearman's rho = 0.423, p < 0.001).
12Nine subjects reported a lower number of heads than the number of coins they actually took out of
the envelope. For our analysis, we use the number of coins taken as the outcome variable. Our results
remain the same if we use the reported number of heads instead (see Table B.1 in the online appendix).
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean SD
Age 14.938 2.015
Female 0.432 0.497
Swiss nationality 0.673 0.471
High school 0.488 0.501
Parental education 0.364 0.483
Crystallized intelligence 20.401 7.471
Fluid intelligence 43.370 10.331
Grade point average (self-reported) 4.632 0.535
Absenteeism 0.981 1.522
Disruptiveness 0.981 1.530
Homework non-completion 1.815 1.991
School misbehavior index 1.259 1.355
This table reports descriptive statistics. Age is measured in years. Female, Swiss nationality, High
school, and Parental education are dummy variables. Parental education equals to one if at least one
parent has a university degree. Crystallized and Fluid intelligence are based on the scores from the
word ﬂuency test and the symbol-digit correspondence test, respectively. Grade point average is the
self-reported grade point average on a scale from 1 (worst) to 6 (best). Disruptiveness, Homework non-
completion and Absenteeism are three measures of school misconduct, based on the teachers' assessments
on a scale from never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves (= 6). School misbehaviour index is
the average of the three items of school misconduct. The number of observations is 162, except for age
(N=161) because one subject did not state his age.
uated the students on a scale from never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves (=
6). These measures of school misbehaviour were inspired by the US National Educa-
tional Longitudinal Surveya study that followed a nationally representative sample of
more than 20,000 students over several years. We chose these measures of school misbe-
haviour as they have been shown to reliably predict future educational achievement and
labour market outcomes (Segal 2013; Autor et al. 2015). Because the three items are
strongly correlated (Cronbach's α = 0.718) we created an index of school misbehaviour
using the unweighted average of all three items. Our regression analysis uses the school
misbehaviour index to reduce the inﬂuence of measurement error, but we also report
the results using the three measures of misbehaviour separately (see Table B.2 in the
online appendix). We matched teachers' evaluations with the experimental data using
identiﬁcation codes to preserve subjects' anonymity.
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2. Results
The results indicate that a signiﬁcant proportion of the subjects cheated by inﬂating
their number of successful coin tosses. Figure 1 shows that the empirical distribution of
coins taken is shifted towards a higher number relative to the honest benchmark provided
by the binomial distribution. The outcomes ten, nine, and eight coins are signiﬁcantly
overrepresented (p < 0.001 for all three outcomes, binomial tests), whereas two, three,
four, and ﬁve coins are signiﬁcantly underrepresented (p = 0.011, p < 0.001, p = 0.032,
and p = 0.055, binomial tests). On average, the students took 62.8% of the coins in
the envelopes (95% conﬁdence interval: 60.0%, 65.7%).13 Assuming that none of the
participants cheated to his or her disadvantage we estimate that 25.7% of the coins were
misreported.14
We also analysed individual determinants of cheating using multivariate regression
analysis. Higher earnings are less likely to be the result of chance. Thus, we use the
number of coins each subject took as a proxy for cheating in the regression analysis.
Column (1) of Table 2 indicates that female students behaved more honestly than male
students as they took signiﬁcantly less coins (p < 0.000, t-test).15 Moreover, we found
that high school students took signiﬁcantly less coins than those from middle school after
controlling for age (p = 0.011, t-test), which could be explained by less deviant students
selecting into higher education. Earnings in the coin tossing task and the two measures
of cognitive ability are negatively correlated. However, the correlations do not reach
statistical signiﬁcance, neither for crystallized nor for ﬂuid intelligence (p = 0.599 and
13If we use reported outcomes instead, the percentage of heads is 61.6% (95% conﬁdence interval:
58.9%, 64.3%).
14The calculation of percentage of misreported coin tosses is straightforward if we assume that none
of the participants cheated to his or her disadvantage (see Houser et al. 2012). Let h be the percentage
of coins taken from the envelopes and m be the percentage of misreported coin tosses. For any given
coin toss, a participant who cheats keeps it with a probability of 1. By contrast, a participant who is
truthful keeps each coin with a probability of 0.5. Thus, the percentage of coins taken from the envelope
is h = m ∗ 1 + (1−m) ∗ 0.5 = 0.5 ∗ (1 +m). Solving the equation yields the percentage of misreported
coin tosses m = 2 ∗ h− 1.
15Dreber and Johannesson (2008) document a similar gender diﬀerence in dishonest behaviour.
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
Figure 1: Students' Behaviour in the Coin Tossing Task
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The ﬁgure indicates that a signiﬁcant proportion of students cheated in the coin tossing task. The
empirical distribution of coins taken (green bars) is shifted towards higher earnings relative to the
binomial distribution implied by fully honest behaviour (blue bars).
p = 0.744, t-tests).
We next examined whether our experimental measure of cheating is related to school
misconduct. Panels (a) to (c) in Figure 2 illustrate the average scores for the three
measures of school misconduct for subjects who took more than ﬁve coins (i.e., subjects
who presumably cheated) and those who took ﬁve coins or less.16 Together, the three
panels highlight that behaviour in the coin tossing task is positively associated with
each measure of school misbehaviour. Subjects who took more than ﬁve coins score 0.5
points (or 72%) higher on disruptiveness in class, 0.9 points (or 69%) higher on non-
completion of homework, and 0.4 points (or 61%) higher on absenteeism relative to the
other subjects. Using the raw data, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant correlations between
16Five coins corresponds to the median number of claims. Alternatively, Figure A.2 in the online
appendix illustrates that there is a monotonic relationship for all three measures of school misbehaviour
when the data is split by tertiles of coins taken.
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the number of coins taken and disruptiveness and homework non-completion (p = 0.003
and p = 0.020), but the correlation with absenteeism fails to reach statistical signiﬁcance
(p = 0.136, Spearman tests).
Figure 2: Behaviour in the Coin Task and School Misconduct
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The ﬁgure shows that, relative to those who took ﬁve coins or less (i.e. ﬁve coins corresponds to the
median), students who took more than ﬁve coins (i.e., those who presumably cheated to a greater
extend) disrupt the class to a larger degree (a), fail to do their homework more often (b), and are more
frequently absent from school (c). Error bars indicate the standard error of the mean (adjusted for
clustering at the class level).
We additionally estimated regression models to control for factors that might jointly
inﬂuence cheating and school misbehaviour. In the regression analysis, we use the school
misbehaviour index, which is the average score of all three individual measures of school
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
A
cc
ep
te
d 
A
rt
ic
le
misbehaviour (see Figure A.3 in the online appendix for a graph depicting the distribution
of the school misbehaviour index). Our main results are similar if we analyse each
measure of school misbehaviour separately (see Table B.2 in the online appendix).
Column (2) of Table 2 conﬁrms that behaviour in the coin tossing task is signiﬁcantly
related to school misbehaviour when controlling for age, gender, nationality, education
level, and parental education. A higher number of coins taken is associated with increased
behavioural problems in school (p = 0.015).17 Interestingly, in addition to pocketing a
lower number of coins, female and high school students also misbehave less frequently
(p = 0.015 and p < 0.008, respectively). The model reported in column (3) additionally
controls for cognitive ability to address potential issues of third variables that correlate
with both school misbehaviour and dishonesty.18 We ﬁnd that crystallized intelligence is
negatively associated with school misbehaviour (p = 0.044), but ﬂuid intelligence is not
(p = 0.771). While diﬀerences in cognitive ability explain some variation in disruptive
and noncompliant behaviour, the predictive power of the coin tossing task for school
misbehaviour remains high after controlling for key background characteristics as well
as cognitive ability (p = 0.015). The coeﬃcient estimate implies that the diﬀerence in
school misbehaviour between students who took ten coins (presumably cheaters) and
those who took ﬁve coins (presumably honest individuals) is more than 0.7 points (or
0.53 standard deviations) on average. For comparison, it would require students to diﬀer
by 2.7 standard deviations in cognitive ability (i.e., crystallized intelligence) to produce
the same diﬀerence in school misbehaviour. The diﬀerence in school misbehaviour be-
tween presumable cheaters and honest students is also larger than the widely discussed
gender gap in misbehaviour (e.g., Bertrand and Pan 2013). In column (4) of Table 2
we removed our laboratory measure of cheating from the regression model and found
17We computed p-values that are robust to clustering at the class level. To account for the low number
of clusters we applied the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al. 2008) using Webb's (2013)
6-point distribution of weights (see online appendix for a description of the procedure).
18For example, Rue and Tobol (2017) and Deckers et al. (2016) found negative associations between
cognitive ability and immoral behaviour.
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that the gender coeﬃcient increases from -0.663 to -0.817. This suggests that gender
diﬀerences in experimentally elicited rule violating behaviour explain almost one-ﬁfth of
the gender gap in school misbehaviour.19
3. Conclusion
In this paper, we examined whether a common laboratory measure of cheating is a
reliable predictor of rule violating behaviour in the ﬁeld. We present evidence on the
link between rule violating behaviour in the lab and ﬁeld using middle and high school
students. We combined experimental data from an incentivized coin tossing task with
measures of disruptive and noncompliant behaviour at school. Our main result is that
students who presumably cheated more in the coin tossing task also misbehave more
often at school. The relationship holds when controlling for students' socioeconomic
background and cognitive ability.
Our ﬁndings contribute to the active debate about the generalizability of laboratory
experiments, i.e., whether data obtained in the lab can be extrapolated to naturally
occurring environments (Levitt and List 2007; Falk and Heckman 2009). We ﬁnd a
signiﬁcant relationship between lab and ﬁeld measures of rule violating behaviour despite
diﬀerences across the two settings, including the context of the choice situation and the
degree of scrutinyfactors which have been argued to make inferences from lab to ﬁeld
environments diﬃcult. Our ﬁndings concur with very recent results from studies that
document positive correlations between lab and ﬁeld measures of dishonesty (Potters and
Stoop 2016, Dai et al. forthcoming, and Kröll and Rustagi 2017). The fact that these
correlations emerge from independent studies that use diﬀerent methods and subject
pools is reassuring for the usefulness of laboratory measures of behaviour, especially
cheating behaviour, as cheating has been conjectured to be more context-sensitive than
19We found very similar results using the pooled Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition methoda technique
that was initially developed for studying gender gaps in labour market earnings (Blinder 1973; Oaxaca
1973).
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other types of behaviour, such as cooperativeness and consumption choices (Abeler et al.
2014).
In a broader sense, our paper also adds to a nascent literature on the relationship
between economic preferences and non-cognitive skills (Becker et al. 2012; Almlund et al.
2011). Our results raise the possibility that intrinsic honesty and expressions of non-
cognitive skills at school share a common underlying mechanism.
University of Michigan
University of Zurich
Accepted: 12 May 2017
Data set (in Stata format), command ﬁle (do-ﬁle), and README ﬁle are available online.
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le Table 2: Determinants of Behaviour in the Coin Task and School Misbehaviour(1) (2) (3) (4)Dependent variable # of coins School Misbehaviour Index
# of coins taken 0.150∗∗ 0.145∗∗
(0.015) (0.015)
Age -0.038 0.489∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.731) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Female -1.061∗∗∗ -0.621∗∗ -0.663∗∗ -0.817∗∗
(0.000) (0.015) (0.010) (0.011)
Swiss nationality -0.411 0.143 0.186 0.127
(0.140) (0.226) (0.206) (0.440)
High school -1.018∗ -1.360∗∗∗ -1.033∗ -1.181∗∗
(0.050) (0.008) (0.054) (0.030)
Parental education -0.120 0.462 0.532 0.514
(0.657) (0.190) (0.154) (0.163)
Crystallized intelligence -0.080 -0.267∗∗ -0.279∗∗
(0.599) (0.044) (0.035)
Fluid intelligence -0.041 0.040 0.034
(0.744) (0.771) (0.808)
Constant 8.145∗∗∗ -6.321∗∗∗ -6.239∗∗∗ -5.056∗∗
(0.000) (0.004) (0.005) (0.020)
Observations 161 161 161 161
R2 0.226 0.310 0.333 0.303
This table reports OLS coeﬃcient estimates. p-values are reported in parenthesis. In column (1), we
regress the number of coins taken in the coin tossing task on a set of individual characteristics and two
measures of cognitive ability. Age is measured in years. Female, Swiss nationality, High school, and
Parental education are dummy variables. Parental education equals to one if at least one parent has a
university degree. Crystallized and Fluid intelligence are based on the scores from the word ﬂuency test
and the symbol-digit correspondence test, respectively. Both cognitive ability measures are normalized
to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. In columns 2 to 4, the dependent variable is
the School misbehaviour index, which is constructed by averaging the three items of school misconduct,
including disruptiveness in class, failure to complete homework, and absenteeism (all measured on a
scale from never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves (= 6)). Because the models in columns 2
to 4 use teacher evaluations, we computed p-values that are robust to clustering at the class level. To
account for the low number of clusters we applied the wild cluster bootstrap procedure (Cameron et al.
2008) using Webb's (2013) 6-point distribution of weights (see online appendix for a description of the
procedure). The number of observations is 161 instead of 162 because one subject did not state his age.
Signiﬁcance levels: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01.
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Materials and Methods
We conducted a paper-and-pencil experiment with 162 students from eight classes in two
Swiss public schools. All students from these eight classes participated in the study.
• In the ﬁrst part of the experiment, subjects were asked basic socio-demographic
questions, such as age, gender, nationality, and parental education.
• In the second part, subjects completed two cognitive ability tests: a word ﬂuency
test and the symbol-digit correspondence test.
• In the last part, we measured rule violating behavior using a simple coin tossing
task. Speciﬁcally, subjects were asked to privately ﬂip 10 coins and report the
outcome of each toss. For each coin toss for which subjects reported the outcome
heads they were allowed to keep the coin (worth 0.5 Swiss francs about US $0.55);
they had to put the coin back into the envelope otherwise.
To measure school misconduct, we asked teachers to evaluate their students along 3
dimensions (disruptiveness in class, non-completion of homework, and absenteeism) using
a scale from never misbehaves (= 0) to always misbehaves (= 6).
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
